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We provide a simple model of endogenous product compatibility choice under Cournot 
competition with a network externality. Using the model, we consider how the degree of 
a network externality and product substitutability affects the choice regarding product 
compatibility. In particular, if the degree of the network externality is larger than that of 
the product substitutability, there exist multiple equilibria, involving imperfect, partial, 
and perfect compatibility. However, if another assumption formula regarding a spillover 
effect, which is a component of network size, is made, i.e., the converter case, there is a 
unique equilibrium, i.e., perfect compatibility, irrespective of the degree of the network 
effect versus product substitutability. Furthermore, we show that a perfectly compatible 
product standard is socially optimal and analyze, therefore, whether a social dilemma 
arises in the network products market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With the progress of information and communication technologies, the last two decades 
have witnessed a proliferation of consumer electronic products that exhibit network 
externalities, e.g., hardware and software of video games, computers, smartphones, 
iPads, and others. In such network product markets, problems of compatibility and 
standardization are very important. In particular, the choice regarding compatibility of 
products is significant for both the providers and for the (potential) users of the products. 
Compatibility between products tends to enhance the utility of a product for a user, 
because compatibility is a characteristic of products that interact with other products in 
order to create enhanced performance for users. However, compatibility between 
products tends to be a choice made by providers rather than by users. 
Since the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985), many researchers have 
examined the social and private incentives to achieve product compatibility; that is, the 
trade-off between compatibility and standardization (or between incompatibility and 
perfect compatibility) in network products markets.
1
 In this paper, following the 
framework of Economides (1996), we provide a simple model of endogenous product 
compatibility choice under Cournot competition with a network externality.
2
 Using the 
model, we consider how the degree of the network externality and of product 
                                                 
1
 Regarding previous research on compatibility choice and network externalities, see, 
for example, Katz and Shapiro (1994), Matutes and Regibeau (1996), Shapiro and 
Varian (1999), Gandal (2002), Farrell and Klemperer (2007), Shy (2011), and others. 
2
 Although Katz and Shapiro (1985) assume a homogenous product market, we deal 
with a horizontally differentiated product market, in which firms provide their products 
associated with a network externality. Furthermore, Baake and Boom (2001) consider 
price and quality competition in a vertically differentiated products market with network 
externalities. 
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substitutability affects the endogenous product compatibility choice. 
   Chen and Chen (2011), in a study closely related to ours, analyze product 
compatibility under differentiated duopoly with network externalities. However, based 
on their specific assumption regarding the parameters, i.e., product substitutability and a 
network externality, they consider the case of a strategic substitute relationship. As a 
result, they conclude that the firm’s optimal compatibility choice is to set different 
product standards in the market, whereas socially optimal compatibility involves setting 
one product standard. In their case, a social dilemma arises. 
In this paper, by relaxing the assumption of Chen and Chen (2011), we show that if 
the degree of the network externality is larger than that of product substitutability, there 
exist multiple equilibria, involving an imperfectly, a partially, and a perfectly 
compatible product. Thus, in our case, a social dilemma may not always arise. 
   Furthermore, Chen and Chen (2011) assume that the network size, i.e., the network 
externality, of one firm is composed of the own effect and the spillover effect, which 
depends on the degree of product compatibility chosen by another firm. In other words, 
one firm will design its product for the users of another firm’s product. However, based 
on the formula for network size presented by Shy (1995, 2001), we assume that the 
spillover effect depends on the degree of product compatibility chosen by the firm itself. 
Related to this point, as analyzed in Farrell and Saloner (1992), the effects of 
incompatibility can be mitigated by using an adapter to connect incompatible products. 
There are various types of adapters such as an interface, emulator, converter, or gateway. 
Converters may provide compatibility without constraining product variety or 
technological innovation. Following this view, the progress in emulation technology 
will make standardization unnecessary because, using converters, compatibility can be 
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achieved. 
Therefore, we deal with other tools to achieve compatibility between products than 
do Chen and Chen; that is, we consider the case of converters. One firm will attach a 
converter with its product, enabling the users of the product to also use the product 
provided by the rival firm. In this case, as shown below, the perfect compatibility 
equilibrium only exists, irrespective of the degree of the network externality and 
product substitutability.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a 
simple model and then consider the Nash equilibrium in the product compatibility 
decision game under Cournot duopoly with a network externality. In particular, we 
show that there are multiple Nash equilibria. In Section 3, first, we establish that the full 
compatibility standard is socially optimal. Second, with respect to the case of multiple 
Nash equilibria, we consider the equilibrium selection and then show that the perfect 
compatibility equilibrium is chosen if firms follow the payoff dominant standard. Third, 
we analyze another case of compatibility choice, i.e., the converter case, and then show 
that the perfect compatibility equilibrium exists and, thus, a social dilemma does not 
arise. In Section 4, we summarize the results and present remaining issues. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Setup 
We deal with Cournot competition in a horizontally differentiated products market 
associated with network externalities and consider how firms endogenously choose the 
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degree of compatibility of their products. 
Based on the framework of Economides (1996), we assume the following inverse 
demand function of product i: 
),()(
e
ijii SfqqAP                                         (1) 
where A  is the potential market size, iq  )( jq  is the output of firm i (j), and 
 1,0  represents product substitutability. The network-externality function is given 
by: ),( i
eSf  where 
e
iS  represents the expected network-size of product i. Following 
the concept of a fulfilled expectations equilibrium presented by Katz and Shapiro (1985), 
we assume that .i
e
i SS   Furthermore, following Chen and Chen (2011), we assume a 
linear network-externality function; that is, ,)( ii aSSf   where  1,0a  is a 
network-externality parameter for network size. In particular, the network size of 
product i is given by: 
,jjii qqS                                                  (2) 
where  1,0j  is the degree of product j’s compatibility with product i. If 1j ),0(  
product j operates perfectly (does not operate) with product i. iq )( jjq  represents the 
own (spillover) effect in equation (2). In particular, the spillover effect associated with 
the network size of product i depends on the degree of product compatibility of the rival 
firm’s product j. In other words, firm j chooses the degree of product compatibility of 
product j in terms of operating product i and thus affects the network size of product i. 
Based on equations (1) and (2), the inverse demand function of firm i can be 
expressed by: 
.)()1( jjii qaqaAP                                     (3) 
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Regarding equation (3), we assume that the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price 
effect; i.e., .1 j
j
i
i
i a
dq
dP
a
dq
dP
   For simplicity, we assume that production 
costs are zero. 
 
2.2 The Cournot–Nash equilibrium under a fixed degree of product compatibility 
We derive the following reaction function for firm i: 
.
)1(2)1(2
j
j
i q
a
a
a
A
q






                                       (4) 
Given equation (4), under Cournot competition, the strategic relationship between 
the firms depends on the degree of product substitutability and the degree of product 
compatibility associated with a network externality, i.e., .)(0)( j
j
i a
q
q
 


 
This condition implies that, under Cournot competition, a strategic substitute 
(complement) relationship between the firms holds if the degree of product 
substitutability is higher (lower) than the degree of product compatibility associated 
with the network externality.
3
 In particular, even though the two products are 
substitutable, a relationship of strategic complementarity is sustained under Cournot 
competition if the degree of product compatibility associated with the network 
externality is sufficiently high, i.e., .ja   
Taking equation (4) into account, we categorize the Cournot–Nash equilibrium into 
three cases. 
In case i) (case ii)), there is strong (weak) product compatibility associated with a 
                                                 
3
 As mentioned above, Chen and Chen (2011) assume the strategic substitute 
relationship, i.e., ,ja   holds. 
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network externality: .)( ja   When there is strong (weak) product compatibility 
associated with a network externality, because of the strategic complementarity 
(substitutability) relationship under Cournot competition, the reaction curves of both 
firms are upward (downward) sloping. 
In case iii), there is asymmetric product compatibility: e.g., .ji aa    In this 
case, the reaction curve of firm j (i) is upward (downward) sloping. 
Therefore, we derive the following Cournot–Nash equilibrium: 
 
,
)()1(2
D
aaA
q
j
i
 
                                      (5) 
where 0))(()1(4 2  ji aaaD   and .0)()1(2  jaa   Both of 
these conditions are satisfied because the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price 
effect.  
Given equation (5), the effects of an increase in the degree of product compatibility 
on output levels are given by: 
 
,)(0)(
)()1(2)(
2 j
jj
i
i
aD
aaAaaq








         (6) 
 
.0
)()1(2)1(2
2





D
aaAaaq i
j
i 

                          (7) 
Equation (6) implies that the effect of an increase in the degree of own-product 
compatibility depends on the degree of product substitutability in comparison to the 
network-externality parameter for network size, i.e., ,
a

 and the degree of the rival 
firm’s product compatibility, i.e., .j  Furthermore, equation (7) implies that an 
increase in the degree of the rival firm’s product compatibility increases the output of 
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firm i. This is because an increase in the degree of product compatibility of firm j 
enhances the network size of firm i and thus increases the willingness to pay for product 
i, e.g., equations (1) and (2). 
 
2.3 Endogenous product compatibility choice 
The profit function of firm i is given by: .)1(
2
iiii qaqP   Based on equations (6) 
and (7), we have the following: 
,)(0)()1(2 j
i
i
i
i
i
a
q
qa 









                          (8) 
.0)1(2 





j
i
i
j
i qqa


                                       (9) 
Taking equation (8) into account, we can easily derive the Nash equilibria of the 
endogenous product compatibility choice as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 The following Nash equilibria exist: 
(i) If ,1
a

 then .0**  ji   
(ii) If ,1
a

 then ,0**  ji   and .1
**  ji   
(iii) If ,1
a

 then ,0**  ji   ,
**
a
ji

   and .1**  ji   
 
In regard to (i), if the degree of the network externality is smaller than the degree of 
the product substitutability, both firms provide an incompatible product. In regard to (ii), 
if the degree of the network externality is just equal to the degree of the product 
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substitutability, there are two Nash equilibria; both firms provide either an incompatible 
or a perfectly compatible product. In regard to (iii), if the degree of the network 
externality is larger than the degree of the product substitutability, there are three Nash 
equilibria; both firms provide either an incompatible, or a perfectly compatible, or a 
partially compatible product (see Figure 1). 
   Let us focus on the third case among the three Nash equilibria, where the degree of 
the network externality is larger than the degree of the product substitutability. In this 
case, a firm’s product compatibility strategy depends on the degree of product 
substitutability in comparison to the network-externality parameter for network size and 
the rival firm’s strategy. In particular, if the firm expects that the rival firm’s strategy is 
smaller (larger) than the degree of product substitutability in comparison to the 
network-externality parameter for network size, the spillover effect on its own network 
size is small (large). Hence, the firm provides an incompatible (a perfectly compatible) 
product to maximize its profit. Furthermore, suppose that the firm expects that the rival 
firm’s strategy is equal to the degree of product substitutability in comparison to the 
network-externality parameter for network size. This means that the rival firm provides 
a partially compatible product. Thus, in maximizing profit, the firm is indifferent in 
regard to the degree of product compatibility chosen, in the range from zero to unity. If 
the rival firm has the same expectations, partial product compatibility equilibrium is 
sustained. 
 
 
3. Discussion 
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3.1 Social optimality 
The consumer surplus is 
2
}){1(
22
ji qqa
CS

  and the producer surplus is  
}.){1(
22
ji qqaPS   Thus, social welfare is .
2
}){1(3
22
ji qqa
PSCSSW

   
Taking into account equations (5), (6), and (7), the social welfare effect of an 
increase in the degree of product i’s compatibility is given by: 
,0
)1(3
)1(3
2

















Hq
D
Aaaq
q
q
qa
SW
i
i
j
j
i
i
i
i 
               (10) 
where 0})()]()()1(2)[1(2{ 2  jji aaaaaH   because the 
own-price effect exceeds the cross-price effect. Similarly, we obtain a positive effect on 
social welfare with regard to the degree of compatibility of product j. Thus, we present 
the following result. 
 
Proposition 2 (Chen and Chen, 2011, Proposition 5) A perfectly compatible standard is 
socially optimal, i.e., .1 ji    
 
In view of Propositions 1 and 2, if the degree of the network externality is smaller 
than the degree of product substitutability, i.e., ,1
a

 a social dilemma always arises.
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However, otherwise, i.e., when ,1
a

 a social dilemma may or may not arise. 
   Furthermore, with respect to the aggregate profits, i.e., the producer surplus, we 
easily derive the following: 
                                                 
4
 See Proposition 4 in Chen and Chen (2011). 
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.0
)1(2
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


Hq
D
Aaaq
q
q
qa
PS
i
i
j
j
i
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i
i 
               (11) 
Equation (11) implies that it is optimal for both firms to cooperate in relation to the 
degree of product compatibility of both products, or, in other words, for each firm to 
choose a perfectly compatible product standard. Thus, both firms are likely to construct 
an alliance in relation to the network products (e.g., see Shapiro and Varian, 1999, Ch. 8 
and Ch. 9). 
 
3.2 Equilibrium selection 
With respect to the third case in Proposition 1, we derive the output and profit of firm i 
in each equilibrium as follows: 
   0,0,1,1 iii q
aa
qq 







 and thus    .0,0,1,1 iii
aa


 





       (12) 
Regarding firm j, we have the same results as those in equation (12). Thus, based on 
the equilibrium selection standard presented by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the payoff 
from the perfectly compatible product equilibrium dominates the others. Therefore, both 
firms provide the perfectly compatible product if they follow the payoff-dominant 
standard. In this case, a social dilemma does not arise. 
 
3.3 The converter case
5
 
With respect to the network size, equation (2) implies that firm j itself will provide a 
compatible product that operates compatibly with the rival firm’s product i for its users. 
However, in this subsection, we deal with the case of converters. That is, in this case, 
                                                 
5
 This subsection is based on Toshimitsu (2013). 
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firm i will provide a product with converters that enable users its product i compatibly 
with rival firm’s product j. 
   According to this view, using equation (10.11) in Shy (1995, p. 267) or equation 
(3.15) in Shy (2001, p. 62), let us modify equation (2) as follows: 
,jii
C
i qqS                                                 (13) 
where superscript C stands for the converter case and  1,0i  represents the degree 
of product compatibility (or convertibility) chosen by firm i.  
Equation (13) implies that firm i will provide a compatible product with which the 
rival firm’s product j can operate. Thus, the spillover effect, ,jiq  depends on the 
degree of product compatibility of the firm’s own product. Alternatively, because firm i 
provides the product i attached converter to enable compatibility with product j, jiq  
may be denoted as the convertible effect, rather than the spillover effect. Furthermore, 
we assume the concept of a fulfilled expectations equilibrium.  
Given the modification, we derive the following inverse demand function for firm i: 
,)()1( jiii qaqaAP                                     (14) 
where we assume that the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price effect; i.e., 
.1 iaa    In this case, we can derive the following Cournot–Nash equilibrium: 
 
,
)()1(2
C
i
i
D
aaA
q
 
                                     (15) 
where .0))(()1(4 2  ji
C aaaD   Given equation (15), the effects of an 
increase in the degree of product compatibility on output levels are: 
 
,0
)(
)()1(2)1(2
2





C
j
i
i
D
aaAaaq 

                         (16) 
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 
.)(0)(
)(
)()1(2)(
2 iC
ii
j
i
aD
aaAaaq








         (17) 
Based on equations (16) and (17), we derive the following: 
,0)1(2 





i
i
i
i
i qqa


                                       (18) 
.)(0)()1(2 i
j
i
i
j
i
a
q
qa 









                         (19) 
An increase in the degree of product convertibility of product i increases firm i’s 
output and profits. However, the effect of an increase in the degree of product 
convertibility of product j on firm i’s output and profits depends on both the degree of 
product substitutability in comparison to the network-externality parameter for network 
size and the degree of firm i’s product compatibility.  
Taking equation (18) into account, we derive the following result. 
 
Proposition 3 There exists such a unique Nash equilibrium as .1**  ji    
 
That is, under system product Cournot competition, the firm’s optimal strategy is to 
provide a perfectly compatible (or convertible) product. Thus, in this case, a social 
dilemma does not arise. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
We have considered an endogenous product compatibility decision under Cournot 
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competition in the presence of network externalities. In particular, we have focused on 
the formula that determines a component of the network size. That is, in the case where 
the spillover effect of the network size is decided by the degree of product compatibility 
chosen by the rival firm, there are various product compatibility cases, which vary 
according to the degree of the network externality and product substitutability. In 
particular, when the degree of the network externality is larger than the degree of 
product substitutability, there are multiple product compatibility equilibria: imperfect, 
partial, and perfect product compatibility. Otherwise, an imperfect product compatibility 
equilibrium occurs and, in this case, a social dilemma arises. However, in the case 
where the spillover effect of the network size is decided by the degree of product 
compatibility chosen by the firm itself, i.e., in the converter case, a perfect product 
compatibility equilibrium arises. Thus, there is no social dilemma.  
   There are various issues in relation to our model, in addition to the specificity of the 
demand and network functions. For example, we have assumed that there are no costs 
involved in choosing the degree of product compatibility.
6
 Furthermore, in analyzing 
the decision regarding product compatibility, we have not discussed the issues with 
intellectual property rights, i.e., the choice between technology patents, a registered 
design, a registered trademark, and others. Implicitly, we have assumed that a firm can 
freely exploit the technology and designs of the rival firm to set its own product to be 
compatible without any costs and legal constraints. 
Intuitively, although a perfectly compatible standard is socially optimal, it may be 
natural for competing firms in network product markets to choose an incompatible 
                                                 
6
 Foros and Hansen (2001) analyze connectivity between competing internet service 
providers in the case of cost free connectivity. 
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technology and design. However, in this paper, we have considered how the presence of 
a network externality affects the compatibility decision of competing firms and have 
shown that it is possible for the socially preferable product standardization to be 
sustainable even in a competitive market. 
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Figure 1 
The Nash equilibria under 1
a

 
Note: 
Point O:  0,0  indicates an incompatible equilibrium. 
Point A: 





aa

, indicates a partially compatible equilibrium. 
Point B:  1,1  indicates a perfectly compatible equilibrium. 
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